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introduced a market economy under communist rule, and succeeded in generally 
improving living standards.  The factors that contributed to the introduction of 
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from neighboring countries, (3) poor social policy, (4) initiatives by ex-conservative 
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forces with relatively low labor cost, and (3) investment by exiles.  This paper 
analyzes to what extent Cuba meets these conditions.    
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The Feasibility of Cuban Market Economy:  A Comparison with? Vietnam 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?                   Kanako Yamaoka 
                                     Institute of Developing Economies (IDE), Japan 
 
Introduction 
 
     Although both Cuba and Vietnam are socialist states that implemented their 
socialism via nationalist movements, each of them has followed a unique path.  While 
Vietnam decided to introduce a market-oriented economic system as early as 1986, 
Cuba has maintained a highly centralized economy even after the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union in 1991.  Even after Fidel Castro retired from formal leadership in 2008 
due to health reasons and was succeeded by his younger brother Raúl as the president 
of the Council of State, Cuba’s economic policies of centralization and minimal market 
mechanisms have not changed.  A former Japanese ambassador to Cuba, Dr. Nobuo 
Miyamoto, has claimed that Raúl Castro is interested in Chinese or Vietnamese styled 
economic reforms1, and a Chinese ambassador to Cuba also stated that the Cuban 
government had introduced some reforms in 1993 inspired by the Chinese model 
(Cheng [2007: 28]). Nevertheless, Raúl has yet to make significant changes.  This 
paper is aimed at examining under what conditions Cuba might introduce free market 
mechanisms, and whether the Cuban state would accomplish sustainable development 
were such an economic system to be introduced.  In order to evaluate this possibility, 
the author considers in this paper: (1) Vietnam’s experience of market reform; (2) Cuban 
problems of governance and state capacity, especially regarding the issue of corruption, 
                                                  
1 When Dr. Miyamoto invited Raúl Castro to his official residence in Havana in 1993, at 
the end of his mission as Japanese ambassador, he suggested to Raúl that the Cuban 
government consider some reforms similar to China that open and liberalize the 
economy.  Raúl responded to him that the situation was exactly about to move in that 
direction (that which Miyamoto suggested), and asked Dr. Miyamoto to wait and see 
what was to happen (Miyamoto [1996: 184-85]).    
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considered to be a byproduct of economic openings, that impedes healthy economic 
development.    
     It is not a commonly held view that Cuba will likely introduce Vietnamese styled 
reforms, especially among scholars in the United States.  There are few studies on 
possible economic reform without preceding political reform in Cuba.  In a Miami 
newspaper, Pérez-Stable stated that she would accept Chinese-styled economic reforms 
in Cuba as a “stepping stone” to a free and democratic Cuba (Miami Herald July 5, 
2007).  Yet, this path has never gained a large number of supporters among the Cuban 
immigrant community in the United States.  In a 2007 poll among Cuban-Americans, 
only 5.7 percent of those questioned answered in favor of lifting the US embargo were 
Cuba to open economically without first opening politically.  On the other hand, 10.1 
percent favored trade normalizing given political reforms without economic openings.  
While the largest number of the questioned favored both political and economic reforms 
as a crucial conditions to lifting the embargo, support for democratization without 
economic reform was double that for economic reform without democratization, the 
latter currently taking place in China and Vietnam.? Vietnam’s or China’s experience 
has never been adopted formally in the Cuban government’s policy-making, although it 
is likely that many Cubans prefer economic reforms with more market mechanisms.  
According to a 2005 report by the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies of 
the University of Miami, many of the Cuban refugees after the end of the Cold War 
prioritize economic reforms that would improve living standards, rather than political 
reforms which may bring about democracy2.  Thus, it can be inferred that the majority 
                                                  
2 The report says, “For many, improved living conditions and economic opportunities 
would be enough to satisfy the majority of the Cuban people.”  “Recent Cuban 
Refugees: Their Hopes and Fears,” Cuba Focus, Issue 56, July 2004.  
http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/main.htm 
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of Cubans see economic, rather than political, reforms as the most urgent and needed 
changes.     
Still, there are quite a few studies on the possibility of Cuba moving toward a 
market economy, especially one modeling China and Vietnam.  With the premise that 
Soviet-styled centrally planned economic model never brings about high economic 
growth and improvement of living standards, Perkins [2005] claims that: (1) Chinese 
immigrants abroad first gave investments to China at the beginning of the Chinese 
reforms; (2) Both the Chinese and Vietnamese governments were generally reluctant to 
realize rapid reforms to introduce market-oriented policies, and especially resisted 
approving land ownership; (3) Undervalued exchange rate s in both countries helped 
the development of export-oriented industries; (4) There is a social consensus that, for a 
certain period of time, only a small fraction of the population will become rich; and (5) 
Reforms for a “more competitive industrial and service sector economy” should be 
thorough and complete, not partial.    
The book edited by Brundenius and Weeks is the only comprehensive work that 
attempts to compare Cuba and Vietnam from economic points of view.  They believe 
that the socialist path still has some significance in reforming economies after the end 
of the Cold War, and criticize the reforms taken by Russia and Central Europe.  They 
evaluate Central Asian (Caucasian) countries’ reforms as more mixed and gradual 
(Brundenius and Weeks [2001: 21]), and look at Vietnam’s reforms as a successful case 
of mixed reforms.  They also show that the Cuban economy has been successful in that 
Cuba could avoid sharp economic decline that Russia, Eastern Europe and some Latin 
American countries experienced at the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 or the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997.  However, according to their data on comparative GDP 
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declines among Latin American countries, Cuba was first (it had the most drastic GDP 
decline) in two-year and in three-year declines, and second, fifth, and ninth in one-year 
declines.  They also analyze that US economic sanctions have led to stagnant economic 
growth after Cuba’s recovery from its sharp GDP decline in the first half of the 1990s.  
It is true that the US embargo has made it impossible for Cuba to obtain credits from 
international financial institutions and US banks.  Also US tourists cannot visit Cuba, 
and US firms cannot trade with Cuba except in the category of “humanitarian goods” 
such as medicines, medical equipment and food.  Subsidiaries of U.S. firms in third 
countries cannot trade with Cuba.  Also for a third country, it is quite costly to send 
ships to Cuba, knowing that the ship cannot dock at any U.S. port for 180 days after 
visiting Cuba.  However, Brundenius and Weeks fail to question how Vietnam could 
manage high economic growth from 1987 to 1994, after economic reform in 1986, but 
before the US embargo against Vietnam was lifted in 1995.  It is possible that the 
Vietnamese boom was the result of economic reforms (Doi Moi), and it could be a strong 
proof that one country can develop its economy without the lifting of US embargo.  The 
emphasis of Brundenius and Weeks on state institutions which regulate the economy is 
important (Brundenius and Weeks [2001: 256]), as Mesa-Lago [2008] stresses in his 
analysis of social security and healthcare reforms in Latin America3.  On the other 
hand, they need to show more evidence in their comparison between Cuban economy 
and transitional economies of Eastern Europe, especially its economically successful 
members such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, in order to conclude that 
Eastern European economies have experienced greater disaster than Cuba since the 
                                                  
3 Mesa-Lago admits that Cuba’s highly centralized and universalized social policy, 
especially healthcare system has resulted in Cuba’s best health indicators in Latin 
America (Mesa-Lago [2008: 325-327]), and the role of the state could not be neglected in 
structural reforms (Mesa-Lago [2008: 246]).  
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disintegration of the Soviet Bloc.     
    Pérez-López [1995] finds that Cuba’s reforms after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
were closer to Gorbachev’s partial reforms than Chinese reforms.  His later work with 
Diaz-Briquets on corruption in Cuba argues that only democracy can secure good 
governance which is crucial for economic development in a medium and long-term 
(Diaz-Briquets and Pérez-López [2006]).  This argument has inspired the author of this 
paper, as in China and Vietnam corruption has been a serious impediment to higher 
economic growth, and healthy development of economic structure such as fair 
competition and income distribution.  Yet, the author still considers that it is worth 
analyzing the possibility of a policy strategy that involves economic reforms before 
political ones. Examples from China and Vietnam show that this path of development 
may bring about high economic growth and quick improvement of living standards.  In 
spite of serious corruption problems, both countries have shown that economic 
development has generally brought about increases in living standards and gradual 
social development as a result of economic growth.  In Vietnam, infant mortality rates 
improved from 49 (1990) to 30 (2002), and the rate of malnutrition of children under the 
age of 5 became 34 percent (2002) from 45 percent (1990).  As the Vietnamese 
government retreated from many spheres of social policy at the start of economic 
reforms, those improvements can be understood as the fruits of economic development.  
Furthermore, this type of reform does not require regime change in the short and 
medium-run.  If the primary policy agenda of the current Cuban government is regime 
survival, as Domínguez [1989] pointed out many years ago, this reform is the best 
alternative to guarantee a certain level of economic recovery, while maintaining the 
communist party in power.  This means that it is easier for the current Cuban 
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government to accept the necessity of economic reforms.  If the majority of Cuban 
immigrants to the United States left Cuba for economic reasons, as shown in several 
polls, one might assume that most of Cuban people prefer economic reforms to political 
reforms. As such, it may be feasible to encourage the government to engage in economic 
reforms rather than democratization.  This paper analyzes the feasibility of these two 
types of conditions in Cuba, and questions whether Cuba has the socio-economic and 
geopolitical conditions to introduce Vietnamese-style reforms.   
    The author chose Vietnam rather than China to compare with Cuba first because 
China is much larger and more diverse than Vietnam, which is still much larger than 
Cuba.  North Vietnam succeeded in socialist revolution almost at the same time with 
Cuba.  Also their revolutions are both nationalistic and introduced socialist ideology 
later to sustain sovereignty.  Moreover, both states must concern themselves with the 
influence of the international community, significantly more than China.  In short, 
Vietnam has more common conditions with Cuba than China.      
 In analyzing Vietnam’s experience to compare it with Cuba’s, the author considers 
separately the conditions to introduce a market economy and the conditions to sustain 
one and accomplish high economic growth .  The former conditions, those which made 
it possible for Vietnam to introduce market economy, are; (1) serious economic crisis; (2) 
the demonstration effect of neighboring countries; (3) poor social policy as a source of 
legitimacy for egalitarianism; (4) initiatives by powerful and originally conservative 
leader/s; (5) weak state capacity to let more people to practice relatively free economic 
activities.  The latter conditions which made it possible for Vietnam to sustain high 
economic growth are; (1) sector/s familiar with capitalist economy, both business and 
agricultural sectors; (2) abundant labor force with relatively low labor cost; (3) 
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investments by overseas Vietnamese.   
           
       
I.  How Did Vietnam Come to Adopt a Market Economy Under Communist Rule?: The 
Conditions  
     Dapice [2005] implies that it would be difficult to compare Cuba and Vietnam 
because they have several critical differences in their economies: if the majority of the 
population is urban (Cuba) or rural (Vietnam); if labor force in agriculture is 
agricultural workers (Cuba) hired by state enterprises or peasants (Vietnam); and only 
10 percent of the labor force in Vietnam work in the public sector while 80 percent of 
Cuban workers are hired by the public sector (Dapice [2005: 180]).  Yet, Dapice does 
not focus on those differences as keys to understanding Vietnamese reforms, and 
concentrates his analysis on Vietnamese performance of economic development since 
Doi Moi began.  It is the opinion of the author that the socio-economic and geopolitical 
differences between the two countries may also have made their development strategies 
different.    
   
(1) Economic Crisis 
     The process that enabled the Vietnamese government to adopt a market economy 
in 1986 can be seen in terms of the degree of domestic economic crisis and change in the 
international environment, as well as of socio-economic development under the Hanoi 
government’s leadership.  The communist leaders in Hanoi proudly launched a 
centrally planned economy in 1976, after the victory of the Vietnam War and the 
subsequent unification of North and South Vietnams.  The first condition that made 
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leadership to reconsider socialist economic policy was serious economic crisis.  
Vietnam’s economic crisis under socialism can be divided into two periods; the first 
crisis took place in former North Vietnam (when?); and the second occurred after the 
1975 unification.  The Hanoi Government in North Vietnam gradually expanded its 
socialist economic policy after the Geneva Peace Accord of 1954, which approved 
Vietnam’s independence from France and the division of North and South Vietnam. 
Agricultural production decreased during the years of 1958-1975, and in some years it 
fell to only half the average production of the colonial period (Tri [1990:18-21]).  The 
failure was caused by the Hanoi government’s heavy dependence on agriculture in order 
to invest in heavy industry (Tri: [1990: 22]).  Yet, the problems of a centrally planned 
economy were not broadly recognized, partly because those years overlapped with war 
against France and later the United States, and the people in North Vietnam were more 
ready to sacrifice their welfare for independence and sovereignty.      
     After the end of Vietnam War and the unification of North and South Vietnam, the 
people in the North started to acknowledge various defects of the system.  After cooling 
down from enthusiasm of the victory of the Vietnam War, many northerners started to 
seek better living standards.  Yet, the strongest resistance came from people who lived 
in former South Vietnam.  They had lived under a capitalist system until 1975, and 
were not ready for the collectivization of farms and confiscation of industrial assets.  
South Vietnam had been economically more prosperous than North.  Its land is much 
more fertile than the mountainous North and Central regions, and its fertile Mekong 
Delta always provides its redundant rice harvest to the needy citizens of the North and 
Central regions.  Furthermore, the business sector in urban areas in South Vietnam 
was dominated by ethnic Chinese, who traditionally have been the most powerful 
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business sector in Southeast Asia.  Both farmers and business people in the South 
resisted the Hanoi government’s new economic policy (Kirkvliet [2003:41], Tri [1990:79]), 
and their sabotage and protest drastically impacted agricultural and industrial 
production.   
     It can be argued that there is an economic gap between Cuba and Vietnam.  In 
Vietnam, in the early 1980s, tens of thousands of peasants reportedly died of hunger.  
The Vietnam War had just ended, and both the government and the people had to 
struggle to recover.  On the contrary, the situation in Cuba after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union was not as grave; no single Cuban was reported as dying of hunger in the 
period of 1992-93, the worst period of Cuba’s economic crisis. It is partially due to the 
government’s generous social policy.  Furthermore, the only forceful intervention in 
Cuba since the 1959 Revolution was the Bay of Pigs, while Vietnam was constantly 
attacked by France, the United States and China from the 1950s to 1970s.  Therefore, 
economic crisis in Cuba may not have been as serious as Vietnam’s pre-Doi Moi 
(reforms) period, and one could claim that Cuban people since the first half of the 1990s 
have not been as dissatisfied as the Vietnamese in the early 1980s.  However, most 
Vietnamese, 80 percent of whom were peasants at the time, were used to considerably 
lower living standards than the mostly urban Cuban populace. Discontent with their 
government’s economic policy depends on how they subjectively evaluate the quality of 
their lives, and cannot be conceptualized simply through cross-country comparison.  
Even if Cuban citizens did not die of hunger as often as Vietnamese peasants did, the 
Cuban experience may well have triggered equal discontent toward the government as 
was felt in Vietnam in the 1970s and 1980s.  ?         
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(2) The Demonstration Effect of Neighboring Countries and International Relations  
     There are two internationally influenced paths market reforms in Vietnam could 
have taken.  One is socialist-leaning reforms similar to those of Gorbachev’s USSR and 
Deng Xiao-ping’s China, and the other is the more capitalist system used by members of 
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations).  The reforms that occurred in 
Gorbachev’s USSR and Deng Xiao-ping’s China are obviously two very different ways of 
reforming a socialist economy.  Gorbachev recommended that the Hanoi leadership to 
introduce economic reforms in 1984, when he also greatly reduced Soviet aid to Vietnam.  
Not only Gorbachev’s recommendation, but also the aid cut obliged Vietnamese leaders 
to move forward toward liberalization.  As an economic model, China’s system was 
more suitable for Vietnam according to the Hanoi leadership because of its social and 
cultural similarities.  Both China and Vietnam began their socialist revolutions with 
agrarian societies, where over 80 percent of their populations were peasants.  Vietnam 
always carefully observes policy decisions in China, and the Vietnamese Communist 
Party always holds its twice a decade congress several months after its Chinese 
counterpart in order to evaluate the proposals and changes are to be carried out in 
China.   
     ASEAN offers another that Vietnam could have used had it not had chosen a 
socialist system.  While Vietnam suffered serious economic crisis after the Vietnam 
War, most ASEAN countries, first Singapore, then Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia 
started to enjoy high records of economic growth.  Furthermore, ASEAN, originally a 
regional agreement to defend its members from Communism, transformed into a 
broader impetus for regional economic integration.  Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995, 
ready to coordinate its economic, commercial and monetary system with its capitalist 
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neighbors, and to seek further economic development within the regional framework.   
     Another factor behind the demonstration effect is that China is Vietnam’s most 
powerful neighbor.  Vietnam does not have to worry that a stronger neighbor may 
oppose their new project to adopt a market economy without democratizing.  China 
may have interfered if Vietnam had had introduced both political and economic 
liberalization, taking some prosperous ASEAN neighbors, but as long as Vietnam is 
using the Chinese model, Vietnam has security guarantee from China.  Similarly, 
Vietnam’s smaller socialist neighbors of Laos and Cambodia also have similar policies, 
and as a result all three nations are both geographically and politically secured in the 
international arena.  On the contrary, Cuba is not geographically close to China and 
Vietnam, and also has as its superpower neighbor the United States, which may not 
approve if Cuba were to adopt a Chinese or Vietnamese model.  It would be much more 
difficult for Cuba to get support from its neighbors if it were to try to realize economic 
reform without preceding democratization.    
 
(3) Poor Social Policy in Vietnam     
     Social policy (healthcare, education, old-age pensions, social assistance for socially 
vulnerable citizens, housing, portable water supply, etc.) generally functions as one of 
the most effective redistributive policies of any government.  Socialist states have 
provided, as per Marxist principles, universal social policy to realize more egalitarian 
societies.  Cuba achieved one of the most universal social policies in the world since the 
first half of the 1960s, whereas Vietnam did not.  Free education in Vietnam was 
established only after the unification of North and South, and in the socialist North 
before 1975, individual villages were responsible for funding their own schools and 
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teachers.  Old-age pensions and free healthcare were provided only to the urban public, 
and after the Doi Moi economic reforms of 1986-1989, all these social policies became no 
longer free, and quite expensive.   
   The main reason for this poor social policy is lack of resources.  Both Cuba and 
Vietnam received economic assistance from the Soviet Union during the Cold War, yet 
the amount that Cuba received was much more than that of Vietnam.   
 
Table 1: Soviet Aid to Cuba and Vietnam (1980 – 1988) 
Year             1980     1982     1984      1986      1988       1990 
Cuba            3,243     4,340     5,153     3,280      3,270      3,955 
Vietnam          935      1,000     1,040     1,325      1,365       585  
Source: CIA Handbook, 1982-1991 
 
The population size of Vietnam was almost 7 times as large as Cuba’s, but the total 
amount of Soviet aid to Cuba was 2-5 times as great.  As a result, Soviet aid per capita 
in Cuba was 14-35 times as large as that in Vietnam.  The Cuban government could 
use this advantage to successfully provide universal social policy.     
     Another reason for Vietnam’s poor social policy is its continuous war experience.  
Vietnam suffered from a greater number of wars during the second half of the 20th 
Century.  The first Indochina War for independence from France lasted from 1946-1954, 
and Vietnam was divided into two in the process.  The North Vietnamese government 
in Hanoi decided to unify Vietnam and attacked France, which resulted in the Second 
Indochina War from 1959.  This conflict attracted the attention of US administrations 
who feared extension of the Soviet sphere of influence, and US government interfered in 
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the war from 1964.  The so-called Vietnam War lasted until 1975.  After unification, 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) attacked Vietnam in 1979 (Sino-Vietnamese War).  
As a result of this continuous warfare, the governments of both North and Unified 
Vietnam had to sacrifice much of their resources, and at the end of each war, they also 
had to spend more of their budget on economic recovery.      
Before economic reform, 85 percent of the Vietnamese population were peasants 
living in rural areas.  For this 85 percent, there were few social benefits, and because of 
their socialist government’s heavy dependence on the agricultural sector for industrial 
development plans, both socially and economically Vietnamese peasants gained little 
from their socialist state.  This meant that Vietnamese peasants had no reason to feel 
that they were indebted to their leadership, and that the Hanoi government could not 
rely on its social policy as a source of legitimacy for socialism.  The peasants were left 
out with little benefit, had sacrificed themselves for industrial development working in 
Vietnam’s main industry of agriculture, as a result dying of hunger in the thousands.  
Under these circumstances, the Vietnamese government had few options available 
besides allowing citizens to seek their own survival under a market system.   
Cuba offers very generous social policy to its people, with free education, free 
healthcare and universal social security pensions.  The basic principle behind Cuba’s 
revolutionary government is never to neglect any of its citizens.  While the Cuban 
government failed to guarantee basic consumer life, especially after the end of the Cold 
War, it succeeded in guaranteeing minimum living standards and one of the highest 
social indicators in Latin America.  This accomplishment has contributed to the loyalty 
of the Cuban people to their government, as many citizens acknowledge that the 
government and Revolution have directly improved their lives.  The Cuban people have 
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more reasons to recognize the legitimacy of their revolutionary government than their 
Vietnamese counterparts.  
 
Table 2: Cuba’s Rankings in Social Indicators in Latin America  
????????????????? ?????
????????????????????????? ??
???????????????????? ??
???????????????????? ???????????? ?
??
??? ??????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????? ??
???????????????????????????? ??
????????????????????????????????????????????? ??
Source: UN Human Development Report 2007-08.  
 
     While generous Soviet aid made it financially possible for Cuba to spend more 
resources on social development, one should also note that the Cuban government has 
taken strong policy initiative in implementing such high social development.  The 2007 
national budget shows that the government’s expenditure on education, healthcare, 
housing, social security (pensions) and social assistance are 48.6 percent of total 
national expenditure, almost a half of its budget (ONE [2008]).   
(4) Initiatives for Reforms by Ex-Conservative Leader(s)  
As expressed in the so-called “Nixon-China Syndrome,” conservative leaders are often 
more likely to realize drastic policy change.  While proposals of liberal reformists are 
often opposed and blocked in legislatures by conservative fractions, conservative leaders 
have enough ground to convince fellow conservatives.  It was a former conservative 
leader that proposed and introduced the Doi Moi economic reforms in Vietnam in 1986.  
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It was Truong Chinh,(1907-1988), who had been known as a Maoist theorist in the 
Communist Party in the 1930s and 1940s.  He was already powerful enough in the 
1950s to become general secretary of the party, and introduced agrarian reforms in 
North Vietnam in 1954-56 that caused much confusion and mistakes and eventually led 
to Chinh’s resignation as party general secretary.  While considered for a long time as a 
conservative leader, Truong Chinh converted to reformist in early 1980s when he 
witnessed the misery of rural areas.  In 1984 he organized a small study group with 
young economists and bureaucrats to make a reform plan, and proposed it in the 6th 
Party Congress in 1986.    
     As reasons that Truong Chinh succeeded in realizing Doi Moi economic reforms, 
Furuta [1996: 16] reports, were that (1) he was powerful and held the number two 
position in the party during the 1980s; (2) he was respected by many fractions of the 
party, both conservative and reformist; (3) the hardliner general secretary Le Duan died 
just two months before the 1986 Party Congress.  Because he had been a respected 
conservative leader for many years, Chinh could propose reform ideas without 
jeopardizing his position at the party.   
 
(5) Weaker State Capacity in Vietnam  
     Generally, social revolution strengthens the state and makes it more centralized 
and autonomous from a specific class (Skocpol [1978], Skocpol [1994]), as it did in Cuba.  
Yet, Vietnam could not achieve such as strong, centralized state after the socialist 
revolution. While many scholars argue that revolutions and state capacity categorize 
both Cuba and Vietnam as examples of strong states4, this author believe that Cuba has 
                                                  
4 Skocpol [1978] and Migdal [1988] classify both Cuba and Vietnam as examples of 
 16
a stronger state than Vietnam.  One reason behind its status as a weak state is 
Vietnam’s social and cultural diversity.  Vietnam has 54 ethnic groups.  Each of them 
has their own language and culture, and many ethnic minorities live in mountainous 
border areas.  It was much more difficult for the Hanoi government to educate all of 
them as socialists.  The second reason is the autonomous traditional community in 
North Vietnam, which did not easily accept state control.  Northern Vietnamese 
villages have been famous for their autonomous character since the feudal period, and it 
is said that the king’s rule reaches only until the hedge of the village.  The village has 
itself is autonomous, and if its interest contradict with the king’s, villagers prioritize 
village rule.  This character has continued under the socialist government.  Kirkvliet 
[2005] depicts how peasants protested socialist policy and succeeded in changing 
government policy.  The third reason is resistance in former South Vietnam.  While 
most people in the South supported the national liberation movement, they had many 
disagreements with the policies of the government of former North Vietnam.  Also, 
they lived under capitalist systems and enjoyed richer consumer life than in the North. 
They could not find many advantages behind converting to the Northern system, and 
the Hanoi government met strong protests in the South.  In this sense, Vietnam’s 
economic reforms were introduced in a country in which few social spheres indeed had 
never become socialist.   
 
II: How is Economic Development Sustained?  Conditions for Maintaining High 
Economic Growth 
(1) Sectors Familiar with Capitalist Economics  
                                                                                                                                                  
exceptionally strong states among developing countries.  
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     When the government introduces a new policy, the first question is who is in 
charge of implementing that policy.  When a capitalist system is newly introduced, the 
country requires some people who know how to invest and take risks, how to compete 
fairly, how to respond to customers’ claims, and how to adhere to institutions such as 
economic regulations.  In case of Vietnam, the former business sector and relatively 
rich farmers of the former South Vietnam were the most powerful locomotive of the Doi 
Moi reforms.  Those in South Vietnam lived under a socialist economy for only ten 
years, and most of them maintained their skills in business and management in both 
urban and rural areas.   
     Furthermore, peasants in North Vietnam also used to live outside of the socialist 
economy protected by the government.  They knew how to survive without the socialist 
government’s protection.  They lived in their relatively autonomous villages, built 
schools for their children, took care of their sick by themselves outside of the 
government’s social policy programs, and solved conflicts on land and harvest among 
village members.  Villages in the northern part of Vietnam have been famous for their 
independence since the pre-colonial period, and the socialist government also made 
efforts to penetrate into village structure, succeeding only partially5.  Although the 
government succeeded in distributing land equally among peasant households, 
abolishing classes and income disparity among villagers, the government could not 
control villagers’ lives as thoroughly as the Cuban government.  While the government 
could not provided sufficient social protection, peasants knew how to survive 
independently.  This self-help culture is important when a market system is introduced, 
as citizens can find a way to survive as the government withdraws its protections from 
                                                  
5 Kerkvliet [2003: 29] describes how northern villages resisted state control over 
villagers’ lives.   
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many spheres of life.   
     Here lies is a serious problem that Vietnam has been facing since the initiation of 
economic reform, corruption.  According to Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López, corruption 
happens when there is monopoly and discretion without enough accountability 
(Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López [2006: 5]).  In the short term, most cases of corruption 
tend to occur in the process of privatization.  In any time period, a socialist country 
needs to seek foreign investment, and contracts with foreign companies especially 
attract corruption.  In Vietnam, much corruption occurs when party cadres occupy the 
limited number of posts in joint ventures with other enterprises that have little 
accountability.  There is not a strong enough judicial system to regulate discretion, and 
civil society is not yet prepared to monitor these enterprises.  Díaz-Briquets and 
Pérez-López believe that democratization is a precondition to deter corruption, and 
after democratization government and international institutions can fight against 
corruption, as they have done in former Eastern Europe and Central Asia.  It seems 
that they fear that once party and military cadres occupy high positions of joint 
ventures and mixed enterprises, they also stabilize the political status quo, impeding 
political reform.  However, China and Vietnam face more pressures for political 
reforms, and indeed they have come to allow some civil liberty as they give up economic 
control over their people. Nevertheless, it is too early to judge the impact of a “economic 
reforms first, democratization later” policy on long term social demand for political 
reform.    
 
(2) Abundant Labor Force with Relatively Low Labor Cost  
     Asian industrial development all started from export-oriented strategy, taking 
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advantage of abundant labor forces with low labor cost.  Asian states first succeeded in 
exporting labor-intensive light industrial goods, and later shifting to heavy industrial 
production.  This is also true of China and Vietnam.  Young populations provide 
abundant labor forces to newly developed industrial sectors.  These workers come from 
rural, low-income, peasant families, and migrate to urban industrial zones.   
     These characteristics were or are common in all Asian countries, but they are not 
present in Cuba.  The socialist government has solved, to a great extent, the economic 
and social inequality between cities and rural areas.  Population aging in Cuba began 
twenty years ago.  Vietnam’s population aging started in the mid-1990s, ten years after 
the economic reforms were launched.  It is thus unlikely that Cuba develop 
labor-intensive industries.  The Cuban government needs to consider other 
development strategies.      
 
(3) Investment by Overseas Vietnamese  
     There are 2.7 million overseas Vietnamese (Viet Kieu) in the entire world, and half 
of them live in the United States.  Before the 2004 regulation (explained below), 
overseas Vietnamese were reluctant to invest in Vietnam because they did not like to do 
business with the communist government.  They were willing to help their relatives for 
humanitarian reasons, but did not want to help the government? (Furuya [2002]).  
Many overseas Vietnamese sent money as family remittance since the 1980s, yet many 
of them were reluctant to invest in their ex-fatherland.  In spite of the 1994 Foreign 
Investment Law, and also despite the complete lift of economic embargo of the US 
government against Vietnam in 1995, their investment did not increase to the level of 
their family remittances.   
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     In 2004, in order to attract more foreign capital, the Vietnamese government 
introduced some favorable tax conditions for investments made by overseas Vietnamese.  
This new regulation makes all remittances by overseas Vietnamese tax-deductible.  As 
a result, remittances dramatically increased by over 11 percent of GDP in 2006.  That 
amount is equivalent to the total amount of official development assistance that the 
government received in that year.  Finally, the new regulation has made overseas 
Vietnamese prioritize economic benefits over political resentment.  The Vietnamese 
government expects overseas Vietnamese to send not only money, but knowledge that is 
crucial for industrialization (Ishizuka [2002: 271]).         
     Vietnam’s experience shows that it was government’s policy change regarding 
foreign investments that contributed increases of capital inflow.  The lifting of the US 
embargo against Vietnam did not increase these flows.   
 
III  Evaluation of Applicability of Vietnam Model for Cuba  
(1) Does Cuba Have the Conditions Necessary for the Introduction of a Market System? 
     Among all the conditions examined as responsible for the introduction of market 
reforms in Vietnam, (1) serious economic crisis is present in Cuba, but (2) the 
demonstration effect is only half present, coming from China and Vietnam.  
Demonstration from neighboring capitalist countries is not clearly present, because it is 
unclear which country would be Cuba’s modeling neighbor – the Dominican Republic, 
Puerto Rico, or Costa Rica?  Furthermore, these countries have not integrated in the 
same way as their ASEAN counterparts, and as such do not offer a stable framework for 
Cuba to integrate into its common institutions.   
     (3) Social policy condition may work contradictory to the introduction of market 
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economy in Cuba, because it has strengthened the source of legitimacy of socialism of 
the government, and also because the Cuban people take it for granted to receive 
minimum social protection from the government, and may not be ready to find ways of 
survival without those protections.  Condition (4), initiative by an ex-conservative 
leader, depends on the question of whether Raúl Castro, known as a conservative leader 
for many years, could openly convert to a reformer, as Truong Chinh did.  Also, it has 
been unclear if Raúl is strong enough to convince all the conservative fractions to 
launch reforms, even if he had the intention to do so.   
Up to now, Raúl has not shown any sign of change in his conservative line.  He 
announced some minor reforms such as the approval of sale of personal computers and 
microwaves to Cubans, of Cubans’ contracting cell phones, and equal treatment between 
foreigners and Cuban locals in terms of hotel use.  These changes are better than 
nothing, but did not improve ordinary people’s lives.  The only reform that may solve 
even partially the material shortages of the Cuban people is to rent idle farmland to 
individual farmers free of charge.  Yet, it still is not known how farmers would have 
enough incentives to produce more food, even with more land.  Since succeeding his 
brother Fidel in February 2008, or his virtual succession in August 2006, he appointed 
new leadership members almost solely from the group of conservative first-generation 
revolutionaries, and it seems unlikely that he will resort to reformist policies, as he 
would have to convince all these conservative military cadres if he ever wanted to 
implement economic reforms.  Suchlicki points out that the Cuban military, which has 
more than 50 percent of the national economy under its control, will never allow the 
introduction of market economy, because that means the military must abandon much 
of its privileges in the economy, privatizing their own state enterprises, most of which 
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are the most productive enterprises in the country (Suchlicki [2008]).  If that is true, 
Raúl will need to compromise between the people’s demand to improve their living 
standard and the military’s interests in the economy.  He should be strong enough to 
persuade the military if he wished to introduce market mechanisms.  As Raúl is the 
second highest ranking of Cuban politics mainly because he is Fidel’s brother, he may 
not capable enough to obtain consent from all conservative fractions as Truong Chinh 
(or Nixon) did.  Or it is also possible that Raúl is unable to implement any new policies 
as long as his elder brother Fidel is alive.   
     Condition (5), state capacity, determines to what extent the government could 
implement socialist system in the society and economy.  If many spheres of the society 
were untouched in Vietnam because of lack of state capacity, or if the society is too 
strong in Vietnam, as Migdal [1988] describes for Turkey, it is easier to introduce 
market economy because socialist system had never been fully internalized by citizens.  
However, the Cuban government succeeded in penetrating in almost every sphere of the 
society, and has transformed the society with their revolutionary institutions.   
 
(2) Can Cuba Sustain Economic Development?  
     Condition (1) of existence of a certain number of people who are familiar with 
capitalist economy is not applicable in the case of Cuba.  The question will be how 
quickly the people can learn the mechanisms of a newly introduced system, such as the 
taxation, investment, risk-taking and governance.  Some argue that Cubans may be 
able to learn them quickly because they have experiences in black market activities 
(Saney [2004]).  Yet, in the example of Vietnam, people in former North Vietnam, who 
also used to obtain many of their necessities in black market, have been slow in learning 
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how to do business in a capitalist economy.  Vietnam’s high economic development has 
been led mainly by people in former South Vietnam, whom people in former North 
Vietnam could learn from.  Twenty years after the Doi Moi reforms were introduced, 
there are still many lags in development between those two regions, and people in 
former North Vietnam are still in the middle of the learning process.  Condition (2) of 
abundant and inexpensive labor force could be relative.  As population aging has been 
ongoing in Cuba for twenty years, one cannot expect abundant young labor force.  Yet 
the question of labor cost may be relative, compared to those in Cuba’s neighboring 
countries in the Caribbean, which enjoy relatively high wage levels compared to Mexico 
and Central America, and also operate in industries that Cuba would likely choose as 
export sectors.  It is obvious that Cuba can never compete with China and Vietnam in 
the light industries sector, but if it chooses to export services, especially 
knowledge-based services such as medical staff service, as Cuba has been exercising in 
recent years to Venezuela, Bolivia and other developing countries in Asia and Africa, or 
as the Philippines has done in Asia and the United States, Cuba may be able to compete 
in the world market.   
     Condition (3) of investment by the exile community has been important in both 
Vietnam and China, especially after the government made favorable legal conditions for 
their investments.  The possibility of Cuban-American community for investment in 
Cuba perhaps depends on reconciliation of both US and Cuban governments and also 
the emergence of younger generation which may accumulate capital in the United 
States, as did Vietnamese-Americans have done.   
One of the greatest obstacles for investments by Cuban-Americans would be their 
strong demand for the democratization of Cuba.  The Vietnamese model did not bring  
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Table 3: Conditions to Introduce Market Economy  
Condition to Introduce Market 
Economy 
Vietnam Cuba 
(1) Economic Crisis Yes Yes 
(2) Demonstration Effects Yes (China and ASEAN) Yes (China and Vietnam)
(3) Social Policy Poor Generous 
(4) Initiatives by 
Ex-Conservative Leader/s 
Yes Unclear 
(5) State Capacity Weak 
(Society strong) 
Strong 
(Society weak) 
 
Table 4  Conditions for High Economic Growth 
Condition for High Economic 
Growth 
Vietnam Cuba 
(1) Sector Familiar with 
Market Economy 
Yes  
(in former South Vietnam)
No 
(2) Labor Force Abundant and inexpensive Not abundant, cost is 
unclear 
(3) Investments by Overseas 
Residents or Immigrants 
Yes, after the new 
investment policy of 
Vietnamese government 
Unclear, depend on 
conditions of Cuban 
government 
 
about political reforms in the short term.  According to the 2007 FIU Cuba Poll by 
Cuban Research Institute, still the largest group (35 percent) of the respondents feels it 
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necessary to wait for both political and economic transition in order to lift US embargo 
against Cuba, while the 6 percent responded that they would support cessation of the 
embargo with only economic changes.  Because the second largest group (29 percent) 
supports unconditional lift of the embargo, this does not mean that most of them stick to 
political reforms as the primary condition to normalize the bilateral relations, but this 
tendency to prioritize democratization may discourage the advancement of 
Vietnamese-style reforms.  The same tendency can be observed in the US government, 
as the Helms-Burton Act declares that the US government would lift the embargo only 
when both Fidel and Raúl Castros resign from all political positions, and also when the 
provisional government prepares for free elections with a multiparty system.  Indeed, 
one-third of the Cuban-American community and the legally restrained US government 
would be the greatest external obstacles for any Cuban government effort to realize 
Vietnamese-styled reforms.     
 
IV. Conclusion  
     Although both Cuba and Vietnam became socialist in the 1950s, there are many 
differences in conditions of the two countries.  Vietnam has successfully introduced a 
market economy and maintained high economic growth while the maintaining a 
single-party system.  This has been a good method of survival for the Vietnamese 
communist regime, and could be an appropriate model for Cuba.  Yet, there are some 
conditions that Vietnam has that are difficult to duplicate in Cuba.  Regarding factors 
that contribute to the introduction of a market economy, Cuba’s generous social policy 
and strong state capacity may impede its people from adapting to a capitalist system.  
In Vietnam’s case, those conditions allowed the Hanoi government to leave much space 
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free from socialism even during the height of socialist era of the 1970s and 1980s.  The 
question of whether Raúl Castro would become a powerful reformist like Truong Chinh 
is unclear at best.  As Fidel Castro remains quite influential even since his retirement 
in February 2008, Raúl may not be able to officially show the public that indeed he 
desires more economic reforms.  Yet, as far as his bureaucratic appointments are 
concerned, Raúl has chosen to follow the same path as his elder brother.   
There is even more uncertainty regarding conditions for high economic growth.  
Vietnam was fortunate to have people who were familiar with the capitalist system in 
its southern region, which Cuba does not have.  The labor force is no longer abundant 
in Cuba due to population aging, and the government will need to find a different way 
from Vietnam to compete internationally.  Both the Cuban and US governments need 
to prepare good circumstances to promote investments under a capitalist system.   
The issue of corruption and good governance is complicated, as Vietnam neither 
has been able to overcome this problem.  Yet, rapid democratization is not necessarily a 
solution to bad governance and corruption, at least short and medium terms, as one can 
see in Russia and Eastern Europe.  The author agrees that good governance will 
emerge eventually with democracy, but it is the Cuban people that can decide how long 
they can tolerate their lack of economic and political freedom.   
The current Cuban government may well fear introducing Vietnamese-styled 
reforms as they dread how society may diversify through economic liberalization and 
the empowerment of new private sector. These developments could inspire demands for 
democratization in the long run.  Vietnamese styled reforms are similarly not free from 
democratization.  Adoption of market system means that the government withdraws 
from many parts of the economy, leaving them in the hands of the private sector.  It 
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also means that the government loses its power over the population via the economy.  
People no longer need to worry that the government might cut their salaries, demote 
them or lay them off if they express views different from that of their government.  
Interests become diversified and people’s demands for a multiparty system grow 
dramatically.  People working in the private sector can accumulate capital to form 
political movements, outside of official frameworks such as mass organizations.  Both 
China and Vietnam chose development paths through foreign direct investment, and, 
due to resulting influence of international financial institutions, are more vulnerable to 
external shocks.  This increases foreign influence on domestic issues extending beyond 
economic ones. Thus, there are many factors that may concern the Cuban regime for its 
own survival.  In fact, the Vietnamese Communist Party is frequently pressed to form 
a multiparty system.  At the 10th Party Congress of 2007, it is reported that there were 
heated arguments on the topic, and the resolution of the Congress was not announced 
until three months after its closure.  Already there is more civil liberty in Vietnam 
such as free access to the Internet, legal criticism of the government by writing letters 
to the editors of some newspapers and journals, and the approval of many private 
publications.  The current Cuban government may face the same kind of pressure from 
its people were it to introduce market reforms.  The new administration of Raúl Castro 
has allowed more open expression of discontent in some newspapers and meetings at 
universities and work places, but still there is much less freedom in Cuba than Vietnam 
and China.  This will be a political choice: (1) short-term stabilization of the society 
through improving people’s material lives with long-term risks of democratization; or (2) 
the status quo, or short-term acquisition of power and stability through repression and 
military support at the cost of long-term uncertainty and instability as the government 
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maintains a zero-sum game.  Considering Raúl’s leadership selections in February 
2008 and in March 2009, his government has chosen the second path.  Yet, that means 
that the government has chosen to sacrifice the economic well being of its people for 
short-term stability.. One wonders how sustainable this will be in the long run.     
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